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Abstract
  Most studies of the distributional effect of trade focus on static models,
comparing effects across industries or skill groups. By contrast, this paper
provides US estimates of a dynamic longitudinal model of sectoral choice
with mobility costs in an open economy subject to trade shocks. Parameter
estimates are used for simulations of the dynamic model (in a general
equilibrium framework), that show: 1. Differences in sectoral mobility of
younger versus older workers, 2. The speed with which workers can find
new jobs in other sectors if they lose their jobs because of free trade,
3. Gradual adjustment of wages and labor in response to a trade shock, and
4. The welfare effects of a hypothetical trade liberalization in the metal
manufacturing sector (which has been especially vulnerable to trade
shocks in the past, the steel industry in particular). The results suggest that
moving costs are large (more than one year's wage) and increase with age.
Both a worker's welfare loss in the metal sector and welfare gain in the
other sectors increase with sectoral experience. Older workers’
distribution of gains and losses from trade liberalization has a very large
variance while young workers’ distribution shows little deviance. The
results also suggest that older workers take longer to find new jobs than
younger workers.
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In order to analyze the welfare e⁄ects of trade liberalization, it is crucial to know how
mobile workers are. If all workers are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors, then
all workers would be unanimously better o⁄ or worse o⁄ after a liberalization. If all workers
are absolutely immobile, then there would be clearly distinct winners and losers from free
trade. In reality, mobility costs probably lie between these two extremes and vary across
groups. One important source of variation relates to the age of a⁄ected workers. In this
paper, I analyze how trade liberalization a⁄ects younger and older workers using estimates
from a dynamic sectoral choice model with intersectoral mobility costs. The model includes a
careful modelling of labor markets in a way similar to the labor economics models. However,
my primary objective is to study crucial questions about the welfare e⁄ects of trade policy
that could not be investigated otherwise. I simulate a hypothetical trade liberalization in the
metal manufacturing industry using estimates of the structural model of labor supply and
calibrated labor demand equation parameters. I compute the speed with which workers can
￿nd new jobs in other sectors and the overall welfare e⁄ects on younger and older workers.
Although it has been discussed in the popular media, the intergenerational e⁄ects of trade
liberalization have not been explored previously by economists. For example, according to
opinion polls conducted in 2002 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, older people in 36 out
of 44 countries surveyed, including the USA, are less enthusiastic about free trade compared
to the young1. In this research, the attitudes of younger and older workers towards free
trade are explained by mobility di⁄erences. Older workers, who are less mobile compared to
young, should be more split in seeing free trade good or bad depending on their sector.
Unlike this research, most studies of the distributional e⁄ect of trade focus on static
models without mobility costs. I prefer to use a dynamic model because limited worker
1Countries where young workers are more enthusiastic about increasing trade with other countries: An-
gola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Germany,
Ghana, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, Ukraine, United
States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam. In the following 8 countries the opposite is observed: France,
Guatemala, Honduras, South Korea, Mali, Pakistan, Uganda, Lebanon.
2mobility implies gradual adjustment after trade liberalization, causing long run and short
run e⁄ects to di⁄er. The importance of mobility costs and gradual adjustment was recently
emphasized by Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2002) (henceforth CCL). They illustrate
this importance with a dynamic model of labor mobility where workers choose a sector by
considering idiosyncratic random moving costs and average wages. The Keane and Wolpin
(1997) model from the labor economics literature (henceforth KW) is also relevant, since it
is an occupational choice model where workers choose between blue collar or white collar
occupations, going to school, or staying at home. KW model how workers, who are het-
erogeneous, accumulate occupation-speci￿c human capital. In this work, I extend previous
international trade research by incorporating human capital accumulation and heterogeneous
workers similar to KW. Unlike them, I focus on sectoral choice because sectors, rather than
occupations, are directly a⁄ected by trade policy. For the policy simulations, I consider a
labor demand with endogenous wage equations derived from the production functions in
addition to the labor supply derived from workers￿optimization problem. A trade shock
is introduced to the model by a tari⁄ reduction in the metal sector. The tari⁄ reduction
changes real prices, which causes a gradual adjustment of the labor and the wages. The
simulations are conducted in a dynamic general equilibrium framework with overlapping age
groups, (similar to Lee and Wolpin 2004).
Most of the previous research, such as Borjas and Rosen (1980), attributed decreases in
mobility with age to increases in wages with tenure. The decrease in mobility with age can
be attributed to speci￿c human capital as in Topel (1991), better job match as in Jovanovic
(1979) or implicit contracts as in Lazear (1979). Groot and Verberne (1997) suggested that
decrease in mobility with age can be partially attributed to non-￿nancial reasons as well.
Mortensen and Neumann (1989) reported that roughly 30% of inter-￿rm transitions involve
a worker voluntarily moving to a ￿rm o⁄ering a lower wage than his current job, suggesting
that unobservable factors contribute signi￿cantly to labor mobility. Consistent with previous
research, there are three factors in the model that cause mobility di⁄erences: ￿rst, sector-
speci￿c experience increases wages so older workers lose more if they quit their sector; second,
3workers face a non-pecuniary moving cost with a component that increases with age; third,
the time horizon for older workers is shorter than for younger workers, which mutes both
positive and negative e⁄ects of free trade.
I focus in the model on workers who di⁄er by sectoral experience and by market ex-
perience. As workers get older, their market experience (de￿ned as age minus schooling)
increases. Sectoral experience (de￿ned as number of years spent in the current sector) is also
positively correlated with age, however it is endogenous in the model, unlike market experi-
ence. I also consider retired workers with a ￿xed endowment who only care about prices and
their purchasing power. Workers choose among ￿ve aggregate sectors (Agriculture, Manufac-
turing, Metal, Service, Trade) or ￿stay at home￿considering wage o⁄ers, preference shocks
and mobility costs. I estimate di⁄erent versions of the model with alternative simplifying
assumptions to show which modi￿cations are most important, such as serially correlated
preference shocks and a log-linear wage equation. As far as I know, exploring these alterna-
tive models of intersectoral mobility represents a contribution to the labor literature as well
as the trade literature.
Previous literature on displaced workers is relevant, but very di⁄erent in terms of formuliz-
ing research question. Studies on displaced workers analyze the wage e⁄ects of displacement
on workers who lose their jobs mostly because of free trade. There are two major di⁄erences
between my work and them: ￿rst, I look at the welfare e⁄ects rather than wage e⁄ects;
second, with a general equilibrium approach I can analyze the e⁄ect of trade liberalization in
metal sector on other sector workers as well. I recognize that most of the studies on displaced
workers formulize more sophisticated wage tenure pro￿les, since they are partial equilibrium
models unbounded by the size of state space.
The estimates show that the monetary equivalent of workers￿costs of changing sector
is more than one year￿ s average real wage. The calculated cost includes all monetary and
psychological costs except a possible wage decrease. In addition, the non-random compo-
nent of the moving cost increases rapidly with age, reducing the mobility of older workers.
Experienced workers with sector-speci￿c human capital will incur an additional wage drop.
4I simulate a hypothetical trade liberalization in the metal manufacturing industry using esti-
mated parameters from the structural model. The metal sector is chosen because it has been
especially vulnerable to trade shocks in the past, particularly a⁄ecting the steel industry.
By the introduction of free trade, younger metal workers will be worse o⁄ but less worse o⁄
compared to older workers. The younger workers in other sectors will be better o⁄but again
less so than older workers. This stronger e⁄ect on older workers results in a broader division
among older workers in viewing trade liberalization as good or bad.
I use a method which can be described as a combination multinomial logit and numerical
integration to estimate the basic version of my model. For more complicated versions, such
as the case of serially correlated shocks, I use the Indirect Inference method introduced
by Smith (1993) and Keane and Smith (2003). For the simulations, a variation of multiple
shooting is used to solve the model in steady state and transition similar to Artu￿, Chaudhuri
and McLaren (2003).
In the next section, the basic model and its variations will be described. In the third
section, the data set will be brie￿ y analyzed. The fourth section will present the estimation
results. The ￿fth section will discuss the simulation results and its economic implications.
Detailed explanations of the solution methods are available in the appendix.
2 Model
In this section, I will present the basic estimation model with linear wage equation and iid
preference shocks. Then I will discuss extensions which simplify the state space in certain
ways that allow me to explore log linear wage equation and serially correlated preference
shocks.
2.1 Basic Model
Assume that there are 6 sectors2 in the economy with a total of N workers. Workers
choose a sector in which to work in each period. If a worker indexed by n decides to work
21. Agriculture, Construction and Mining, 2. Manufacturing except Metal, 3. Metal, 4. Service {Trans-
portation, Public Utilities, Communication, Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Repair, Personal, Entertain-
ment, Professional Service, Public,etc.} 5. Trade {Wholesale and Retail}. 6. Staying at Home.
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I will de￿ne the sectors below. A worker, n, receives wage wni
t from working in sector i, with
the wage equation3 given by
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where hni
t is the human capital level for individual n, ￿ wi
t is the average wage in sector i and ￿ hi
t
is the average human capital level in the sector, zni
t is a mean-zero random shock distributed
"normal" with variance ￿2
z, SecExpni
t is the sector speci￿c experience4, and MktExpn
t is
market experience (de￿ned as age minus schooling). The workers who stay at home do not
receive any wage, wn6
t = 0. See the Appendix for details on deriving the wage equation.
Di⁄erent from KW, I assume that all sector speci￿c experience is lost if a worker changes
her sector. Even if she returns to her initial sector she has to start over from zero sectoral
experience. Without this assumption the state space would be extremely large5. Attending
high school as ￿nal degree is denoted as HighSch and college is denoted as College6. Sectoral
experience evolves as
if d
n
t = d
n
t￿1 =) SecExp
ni
t = SecExp
ni
t￿1 + 1,
else if d
n
t 6= d
n
t￿1 =) SecExp
ni
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3Although my formulation of the wage equations is di⁄erent from the previous literature it yield to a
wage tenure pro￿le consistint with the previous literature, such as Topel (1991).
4Neal (1995) shows that ￿rm speci￿c experience contributes little to the observed slope of wage tenure
pro￿les when sectoral experience is accounted for.
5In the next subsections, I improve the model from other aspects such as time persistent preference shocks,
which also makes the state space large. It would be infeasible to consider complicated history of choices, as
in KW, and time persistent shocks at the same time.
6In the next version, I will consider di⁄erent returns for schooling for di⁄erent sectors, which will increase
the number of parameters to estimate. Note that these options are mutually exclusive since they are de￿ned
as ￿nal degree. Unlike KW, I do not model how workers decide how much schooling to obtain, therefore I
do not use individuals who did not complete their education to prevent bias in the estimation.
6In addition to the wage, each worker n receives an idiosyncratic random utility uni
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where wage, wi
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t ) is a function of the state variables and a random shock for the worker.
The state vector st depends on education and experience such that
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The ￿xed utility ￿i is the same for all workers in an industry while the random variables zni
t
and uni
t vary across workers7. Linearity of components of the utility function ensures agents
will be risk neutral so that I do not need to model savings. I assume that random component
of utility, uni
t , is distributed as "extreme value" with variance ￿2
u:
u
ni
t ￿ EV (0;￿u), (5)
z
ni
t ￿ N (0;￿z).
Workers will incur a moving cost, C, if they change their sectors, so Cdn
t ;dn
t+1 > 0 if
dn
t 6= dn
t+1 and Cdn
t ;dn
t+1 = 0 if dn
t = dn
t+1. In this version of the model I will include "Staying
at Home" as a non-market sector and assume that it is costless to chose the non-market
sector, so Cdn
t ;dn
t+1 = 0 if a worker chooses to stay at home in period t + 1. I model the
moving cost as a linear function of age:
C
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n
t ￿ 14).
7I incorporated random e⁄ects to the model in another version which increases the state space signi￿cantly.
The new version of the model is currently being estimated, and the results will be presented in the next
version of the paper.
7The utility and costs associated with each option are summarized in Table 2.1. All workers
are expected to live for a ￿xed amount of time, T. Hence the objective of an individual for
any time t = 1;:::;T is to maximize her present discounted total utility as in Bellman (1957):
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for the last period, where ￿ is the discount factor. Thus I can write the option value of
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and can be calculated numerically. For further discussion refer to the appendix.
Timing:
At any given time period t the order of events for a worker is as follows: 1. Pays the
moving cost C > 0 if her previous sector is di⁄erent. 2. Works and enjoys her utility:
wni
t + ￿i + uni
t , 3. Learns the next period￿ s random shocks
￿
z
nj
t+1;u
nj
t+1
￿6
j=1. 4. Chooses her
sector. 5. Enters the next period t + 1 and repeats steps 1-5 for t + 1.
2.2 Simpli￿ed Benchmark Model
In this version (Model 2.2) and later versions (Models 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5) I assume that the
8moving cost is constant
C
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t ;dn
t+1 (s
n
t ) = 0, if d
n
t = d
n
t￿1, (10)
else C
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n
t ) = C0.
So (6) is replaced with (10) and workers are not allowed to choose "Staying at Home."
Therefore,
d
n
t 2 f1;2;3;4;5g, (11)
and the decision set (1) is replaced with (11). The wage equation is given as:
w
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t = ￿ w
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t + ￿1 + ￿2HighSch
n + ￿3College
n + ￿4SecExp
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t + ￿5MktExp
n
t + z
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t . (12)
instead of (2) where
u
ni
t ￿ EV (0;￿u), (13)
z
ni
t ￿ EV (0;￿z).
All other equations are the same. These assumptions decrease the size of state space and
allow me to work on other extensions in Models 2.3-2.5. Comparing those extensions to
Model 2.2 will show how di⁄erent assumptions about the structure of the model and the
error terms change the estimates. This version also serves as the auxiliary model for Indirect
Inference estimations of Models 2.3-2.4.
2.3 Log Linear Wage Equation Model
Wage equations are log linear by convention, as in the Mincer (1958) wage equation,
not linear as I assumed in the Basic Model. I extended the benchmark model (Model 2.6)
by converting the wage equation to a log linear form and considering a normal error term
instead of "extreme value,"
logw
ni
t = log ￿ w
i
t +￿1 +￿2HighSch
n +￿3College
n +￿4SecExp
ni
t +￿5MktExp
n
t +z
ni
t , (14)
9where zni
t is a iid normal shock with mean zero,
u
ni
t ￿ EV (0;￿u), (15)
z
ni
t ￿ N (0;￿z),
Therefore equation (12) is replaced with (14) and (5) is replaced with (15). The model
is otherwise identical to the benchmark (Model 2.2). I ￿nd that assuming a log-linear
model does not help with estimating the moving costs and is much more time consuming to
estimate. Thus I conclude that assuming linearity in the model does not cause noticeable
bias. I use Indirect Inference (II), which is a generalized version of Simulated Method of
Moments (SMM), to estimate Models 2.3 and 2.4. Di⁄erent from SMM, II involves using an
auxiliary model as a norm to compare actual and simulated data sets instead of moments.
The auxiliary model is based on Model 2.2. See the appendix for details.
2.4 Time Persistent Preference Shocks Model
In real life there is probably some additional heterogeneity among workers that is un-
observed by econometricians. Some workers, for example, like certain sectors better than
others. The idiosyncratic preference shocks assumed above give a new mean zero shock in
each period. This is not very realistic because we would not expect people￿ s opinions to
￿ uctuate randomly over time without showing any persistence. Therefore I changed the
structure of uni
t from iid mean zero to a process similar to AR(I).
u
ni
t = ￿u
ni
t￿1 + ￿
ni
t , (16)
￿
ni
t ￿ EV (0;￿￿),
z
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n Collage
n SecExp
ndn
t￿1
t MktExp
n
t u
n1
t￿1 u
n2
t￿1 ::: u
n5
t￿1
i0
. (17)
As a result, I consider (16) instead of (5) and (17) instead of (4). All the other equations
are identical to the Benchmark model (Model 2.2). By inserting time persistence in the
10preferences, I added more friction in the model along with moving cost and sector speci￿c
experience that were included above, which caused moving costs to become smaller. To
calculate the value functions associated with this version, I assume that uni
t￿1 can take only
three discrete values and I use a discrete Markov chain for that, similar to Tauchen and
Hussey (1991). Hence there are three di⁄erent types of workers with respect to the magnitude
of the idiosyncratic shock.
I do not estimate value of the correlation coe¢ cient ￿, but instead use a ￿xed number,
0:8, for estimation. It is not possible to identify ￿ since II estimation requires the auxiliary
model (the Benchmark ￿model 2.2 in this case) to have at least as many parameters as the
actual model. Still, this will satisfy my goal of showing how serial correlation in preference
shocks changes estimated moving cost.
2.5 No Idiosyncratic Preference Shocks Model
Some models of occupational choice, (e.g., KW), do not consider idiosyncratic shocks to
workers￿preferences. For the sake of comparability, this version shows how the estimates
would change without preference shocks such that uni
t = 0 for all n and i:
u
ni
t = 0, (18)
z
ni
t ￿ EV (0;￿z),
The only di⁄erence from the Benchmark model (Model 2.2) is, (5) is replaced with (18).
Solution methods are described in the appendix.
3 Data
I use 10 periods of the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79)
data on labor markets from 1985 to 1994 for estimation. In addition to NLSY79, I use 17
years of sectoral average wage data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for calculat-
ing the value functions (not directly for estimation) for two reasons: ￿rst, it is not possible
to calculate the average wages accurately using NLSY79 since the sample size is very small;
11second, expected future wages a⁄ect workers￿mobility decisions according to the model, so
by using seven additional years, I make sure that the forward looking property of the model
is not underestimated8. Thus, 10 years of data is used for estimation but the expected value
functions are calculated for 17 years. For the basic model, 969 white males between 21 and
28 are selected. Students are not used until they receive their ￿nal degree so that there is
no need to model education.
I have chosen 6 aggregate sectors: 1. Agriculture, Construction and Mining, (12% of
the workers); 2. Manufacturing except Metal (22% of the workers); 3. Metal, (3% of the
workers); 4. Service, including Transportation, Public Utilities, Communication, Finance,
Insurance, Real Estate, Repair, Personal, Entertainment, Professional Service, Public, etc.
(42% of the workers); 5. Trade, Wholesale and Retail (16% of the workers); 6. Staying at
Home (5% of the workers). Workers who do not work or are unemployed for more than 25
weeks are considered to be staying at home for that year.
The annual probability of changing sectors decreases by age (see Figure 1): it is 20%
when a worker is 20 years old and it drops gradually as a worker gets older. By the time a
worker is 35 years old the probability of sector change is around 4%. Distributions of workers
by age, wage, market experience, sectoral experience and education level are illustrated in
Figure 1.
Neal (1999) reports that there are coding errors in NLSY79 regarding occupations. A
similar error is also present for industry codings. In order to minimize this problem I use
the following method (as in Neal 1999): whenever a sector change is reported, I require that
the worker has to change his employer as well, otherwise it is considered as a coding error
and the original sector is kept.
8Assume that the set of parameters of the model is ￿ =
￿
C0;C1;C0=￿e;￿z;￿1;:::;￿6;￿
1;:::;￿
5￿
. To
calculate expected value functions we only need ￿ and average wages
n￿
￿ wi
t
￿5
i=1
o17
t=1
. However to calculate
probability of moving we need choices, dn
t , and wages, wni
t , in addition to expected values. Therefore it is
possible to calculate the expected value functions for future time periods as long as the average wage data
is available.
124 Estimation Results
One year￿ s average real wage is normalized to 1.0 and I assume that the discount factor ￿
is 0.96 in all models, since I was not able to identify this parameter when I tried estimating
it.
Basic Model (2.1)
See tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 for basic model estimates. The estimated non-pecuniary mov-
ing cost C is quite large and statistically signi￿cant, approximately equal to 1.98 when a
worker ￿rst enters the job market and increasing signi￿cantly by 0.04 every year. Note
that the moving cost is very large because it captures all psychological moving costs and
all unmodelled frictions. Keane and Wolpin (1994) and Lee and Wolpin (2004) report lower
moving costs, however they do not consider idiosyncratic preference shocks for sectors (or
occupations). Note that when idiosyncratic shocks are omitted, the moving costs are sig-
ni￿cantly lower as in the Model 2.5. However, such models do not ￿t the data well since
￿ uctuations in the wages alone fail to explain the gross ￿ ows when preference shocks are
ignored. Sullivan (2005) also reports high moving costs which cause signi￿cant reductions
in the worker utility, as a results of estimation of a labor mobility model with idiosyncratic
preference shocks.
Another factor limiting worker mobility is the sectoral experience wage premium, (￿4),
which increases by 0.04 annually. Since the additional moving cost is large, it shows that
much of the cost is psychological (non-pecuniary) and also quite variable, since the variance
of idiosyncratic shocks is large. In other words, non-pecuniary factors also play an important
role in workers￿mobility decisions .
High school graduates (￿2) earn more than middle school graduates and less than college
graduates (￿3). The wage premium for market experience (￿5) is about half the size of the
wage premium for sector speci￿c experience (￿4). The ￿xed utility associated with each
sector leads to the following ranking: most popular is Trade (￿5), then Agriculture, Mining
13Table 4.1: Basic Model (2.1) - Moving Cost Estimates
C0 C1 C0=￿e
Estimate 1.982 0.042 1.763
Standard Error (0.104) (0.009) (0.045)
Table 4.2: Basic Model (2.1) - Wage Equation Estimates
￿2
z ￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4 ￿5
Var(zt) Constant HighSch College SecExp MktExp
Estimate 0.162 0.081 0.226 0.502 0.038 0.023
Standard Error (0.001) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
and Construction (￿1), Service (￿4), Manufacturing (￿2), and the least popular is Metal (￿3).
Next, I discuss how the parameter estimates change when I ￿rst simplify the model in the
Benchmark (Model 2.2) for the purposes of comparison and then add other complications in
Models 2.3-2.5. See Table 4.4 for a detailed comparison of all the models.
Log Linear Wage Equation Model (2.3)
This version does not have an analytical or approximate closed form solution and must be
estimated using simulations, I use Indirect Inference Estimation similar to Smith (1993). For
Models 2.3 and 2.4, I simulate three data sets for each step in Indirect Inference estimation.
Using more simulations would reduce the standard errors (up to 25%). For example, if 10
data sets were used the standard errors would be 15% smaller. The estimated moving cost,
C, decreases slightly but no major changes in the other coe¢ cient estimates are observed.
Note that the wage equation estimates are di⁄erent compared to the Benchmark (Model
2.2), which is because the parameters are multiplicative. The estimates of wage equation
parameters are consistent with Model 2.2 with respect to their relative sizes.
Time Persistent Shocks Model (2.4)
This version is also estimated using Indirect Inference similar to the previous version.
Table 4.3 : Basic Model (2.1) Utility Estimates
￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4 ￿5 ￿6
Agric. Manuf. Metal. Service Trade Home
Estimate 0.167 0.107 -0.058 0.135 0.245 0
Standard Error (0.045) (0.047) (0.041) (0.049) (0.046) -
14Table 4.4: Estimation Results of all Models
Basic 2.1 Benchm. 2.2 Log-Lin. 2.3. Time Pers. 2.4 No Idios. 2.5
C0 Mov.Cost 1.982 4.006 3.233 2.122 0.479
(0.104) (0.627) (0.094) (0.106) (0.011)
C1 Mov.Cost 0.042 - - - -
(0.009) - - - -
C0
￿e C/Stde(u) 1.763 2.379 2.340 2.794 -
(0.045) (0.057) (0.031) (0.082) -
￿ Corr.Coef - - - 0.8 -
- - - - -
￿1 Agric. 0.167 0 0 0 0
(0.045) - - - -
￿2 Manuf. 0.107 -0.053 -0.027 -0.086 -0.150
(0.047) (0.024) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
￿3 Metal -0.058 -0.250 -0.178 -0.217 -0.102
(0.041) (0.036) (0.015) (0.013) (0.005)
￿4 Service 0.135 0.129 -0.071 -0.154 -0.187
(0.049) (0.021) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
￿5 Trade 0.245 0.071 0.022 0.053 0.007
(0.046) (0.021) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
￿6 Home 0 - - - -
- - - - -
￿2
z Var(z) 0.162 0.122 0.106 0.119 0.115
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
￿1 Constant 0.081 -0.708 -1.150 -0.749 -1.022
(0.015) (0.014) (0.028) (0.015) (0.014)
￿2 HighSch 0.226 0.167 0.271 0.174 0.251
(0.010) (0.008) (0.024) (0.011) (0.008)
￿3 College. 0.502 0.327 0.526 0.330 0.465
(0.011) (0.009) (0.024) (0.013) (0.010)
￿4 SecExp 0.038 0.027 0.051 0.037 0.019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
￿5 MktExp 0.023 0.015 0.021 0.013 0.031
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Discount Factor ￿ = 0:96, One Year￿ s Average Real Wage ￿ w = 1:0.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
15When unobserved heterogeneity caused by time persistent shocks is incorporated into the
model, the estimated moving cost, C, decreases approximately 50% compared to the results
of the Benchmark (Model 2.2), which may be more realistic. It is also noteworthy that the
estimates of the other parameters are very close to the estimates of Model 2.2.
No Idiosyncratic Preference Shocks Model (2.5)
When preference shocks are eliminated, a simpler solution method similar to that used
in Model 2.2, can be used. The elimination of idiosyncratic preference shocks decreases C
approximately 90% compared to Model 2.2, which would be closer to the actual ￿nancial cost
of moving. However, in this case the model does not ￿t the data as well as the Benchmark9.
5 Policy Simulations
I assume that the government decides to abandon tari⁄s in the metal sector, resulting
a 30% decrease in the price level. The price level in the metal sector drops at time 1 and
the announcement is in the end of period 0, so the trade liberalization is a shock therapy
in this case. Note that tari⁄s in the steel industry have been as high as 40%. I will show
how older and younger workers will be a⁄ected di⁄erently from free trade. For the policy
simulation I will consider a general equilibrium method with endogenous wage equations
derived from production functions which requires solution of wage equations and optimization
problem of workers simultaneously. I use Multiple Shooting with the estimates of Model 2.1
and calibrated production function parameters. The solution method is explained in the
appendix.
It is plausible to assume that wages will decrease 30% initially in the metal sector.
However workers will move out of the metal sector to other sectors until wages adjust so
that labor supply is equal to labor demand.
I estimate moving cost and human capital accumulation of workers who are younger than
38 years old. It is possible to extrapolate the parameters for workers who are older than
38 using di⁄erent functions. For the extrapolation I will follow the previous literature, such
9Likelihood Ratio statistic is equal to 1348.
16as Neal (1995), and I will assume that wages stop increasing at the age of 45. I assume
that the non-pecuniary moving cost, C, also follows a similar path to wage tenure pro￿le. I
tried di⁄erent extrapolations of the non-pecuniary moving cost function, and I found that it
does not e⁄ect the results signi￿cantly since the option value of moving is very small for the
workers older than 45.
5.1 General Equilibrium Analysis
After free trade average wages in sectors will change, making some workers better o⁄
and some worse o⁄. In particular, wages in the metal sector will decrease and wages in
other sectors will increase. The main goal of the policy simulation is twofold: ￿rst, to cal-
culate average wages over the transition; and second, to calculate value functions of workers
using the average wages. If wages were known then calculating value functions would be
straightforward similar to the estimation. Note that I used average wages from CPS for the
estimation. For the policy simulation, however, wages need to be endogenous to trade policy
and labor ￿ ows. Value functions of workers are functions of average wages and average wages
are functions of value functions. Calculating wages and value functions jointly is much more
burdensome than calculating value functions alone. To ease the computational burden, I will
assume a simpli￿ed version of Model 2.1 (with smaller state space) for calculating average
wages. Once average wages are known I will use Model 2.1 to calculate the value functions
of workers.
Labor Demand:
Production functions are Cobb-Douglas and the real wages, wi
t, are assumed to be the
real marginal product of e⁄ective human capital possessed by workers. Capital is assumed
to be ￿xed. Share of labor in the production functions is adjusted to match share of labor
in gross domestic product in each sector. Initially, all prices are normalized to be unity and
coe¢ cients are adjusted such that productions in each sector roughly match sectoral gross
domestic products:
w
i
t =
pi
t
CPIt
b
i￿
i ￿
L
i
t￿ h
i
t
￿￿i￿1 h
i
t, (19)
where pi
t is the price level and Li
t is the number of workers in the sector. The equation for
17consumer price index, CPIt, is also derived using a Cobb-Douglas utility function, where
CPIt =
Y
(pi
t)
gi. Parameters for labor demand equations, bi and ￿i are calibrated using
data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Labor supply:
I assume that workers stay in the market for 40 years. Therefore a worker can get a
maximum of 40 years of sectoral and market experience. I discretize the state space so
that market and sectoral experience can only take q values. Note that a worker￿ s market
experience is at least as large as her sectoral experience. Hence, the size of the state space
is TI (q2 + q)=2, where I is the total number of sectors, and T number of years required
for the transition from autarky steady state to free trade steady state. A worker ages with
probability ￿ = q=40 in each period. If we consider all possible combinations of sectoral and
market experience and a thirty year transition, then the size of the state space would be
30 ￿ 6(402 + 40)=2 = 147600 and a worker would age in each period with probability ￿ = 1,
as in reality.
Each worker chooses her sector similar to the Basic Model 2.1, with the decision set as in
(1), so it includes ￿ve sectors and a non-market sector (staying at home). The state-space,
however, is simpli￿ed to ease the computational burden
s
n
t =
h
d
n
t￿1 SecExp
ndn
t
t MktExp
n
t
i0
, (20)
where market experience MktExpn
t 2 f5;15;25;35g and sectoral experience SecExp
ndn
t
t 2
f5;15;25;35g. Note that sectoral experience is less than or equal to market experience by
de￿nition MktExpn
t ￿ SecExp
ndn
t
t , therefore the size of the state space is 1800 (assuming
T = 30), and there are ten types of workers in the economy di⁄erentiated by their age and
experience.
In each period, the probability of aging (gaining experience) is ￿ = 0:1. For example,
a type III worker becomes type VI with probability ￿ in each period (if she stays in her
sector). In addition, if a worker changes her sector, her sectoral experience drops to the
minimum level, which is 5 years. For example, if a type III worker changes her sector, she
18Table 5.1: Worker types
Type I II III IV V V I V II V III IX X
MktExp 5 15 15 25 25 25 35 35 35 35
SecExp 5 5 15 5 15 25 5 15 25 35
Age 25 35 35 45 45 45 55 55 55 55
Table 5.2: Transition Probabilities, Pr(sr
t+1jsn
t )
I II III IV V V I V II V III IX X
dt+1 = dt;Pr = 0:9 I II III IV V V I V II V III IX X
dt+1 = dt;Pr = 0:1 III V V I V III IX X ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
dt+1 6= dt;Pr = 0:9 I II II IV IV IV V II V II V II V II
dt+1 6= dt;Pr = 0:1 II IV IV V II V II V II ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
becomes type II. If a worker with 35 years of market experience ages, she receives a lump
sum payment10 and exits the market, and a worker with 5 years of experience enters the
system.
The wage equation is also simpli￿ed and de￿ned as
w
ni
t =
￿ wi
t
￿ hi
t
￿
￿6 + ￿4SecExp
ni
t + ￿5MktExp
n
t + z
ni
t
￿
, (21)
where the constant11 ￿6 is a weighted average of ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3. The equations (1), (6), (9),
(5), (8) and (9) from Model 2.1 are still relevant for this model. Note that the parameters,
C0, C1, C0=￿e, ￿4, ￿5, ￿6, ￿1, ￿2,...,￿6 are taken from the estimates of Model 2.1.
Labor Allocation in Sectors:
The number of workers in sector i is equal to the sum of all types of workers, Li
t =
P10
n=1 Lni
t . I consider a continuum of workers where
P6
i=1 Li
t = 1. I assume that probability
of a type n worker choosing sector j if she is in sector i is de￿ned as
m
nij
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exp
￿
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j
t+1
￿
sn
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￿
￿ EuV i
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t+1
￿
￿ Ci;j ￿
sn
t+1
￿
=￿e
￿
P
k exp
￿￿
EuV k
t+1
￿
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￿
￿ EuV i
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￿
sn
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￿
￿ Ci;k ￿
sn
t+1
￿￿
=￿e
￿,
10The lump-sum payment is equal to 10 years￿discounted average wage, which is equal to 8.0.
11I assume that all workers have the same level of education. Education only e⁄ects workers￿decison
to stay at home or work, it does not e⁄ect workers￿decison on which sector to work. Because education
increases wages o⁄ers from all sectors by the same amount.
19Table 5.3: Steady State Percentage of Workers
Type I II III IV V V I V II V III IX X
MktExp 5 15 15 25 25 25 35 35 35 35
SecExp 5 5 15 5 15 25 5 15 25 35
25% 9% 16% 3% 6% 16% 1% 2% 6% 16%
where ￿e =
p
6￿e=￿ and the alternative speci￿c value functions are
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The labor allocation equation is
L
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t , (22)
where ~ P
￿
sn
t+1jsr
t
￿
is the transition probability for labor allocation. Note that the transition
probability for labor allocation, ~ P
￿
sn
t+1jsr
t
￿
needs to be de￿ned di⁄erently from the actual
transition probability, Pr
￿
sn
t+1jsr
t
￿
, so that the number of workers in the system does not
change. For example, a young worker enters the market when another worker retires, there-
fore ~ P (IjV II) = 0:1, ~ P (IjV III) = 0:1, ~ P (IjIX) = 0:1 and ~ P (IjX) = 0:1 and for all other
types ~ P
￿
sn
t+1jsr
t
￿
= Pr
￿
sn
t+1jsr
t
￿
. However, the probability of an old worker becoming young
is still zero, Pr(IjV II) = 0, Pr(IjV III) = 0, Pr(IjIX) = 0 and Pr(IjX) = 0.
5.2 Simulation Results
One year￿ s average real wage is approximately 1.0 for a young worker with ￿ve years of
sectoral and market experience, so all numbers presented here could be considered relative
to this wage level. To compare and contrast simulation results for di⁄erent sectors, I will
present results for the manufacturing and metal sectors. The results for all sectors, except
metal and non-market sectors, are very similar.
Labor Adjustment
See Figure 2 for the illustrations of labor adjustment. Note that the label "Young" is
used for workers with 5 years of sectoral and market experience; "Old 1" for workers with
205 years of sectoral experience and 35 years of market experience; and "Old 2" for workers
with 35 years of sectoral and 35 years of market experience.
Initially, approximately 4% of the workers are in the metal sector. After trade liberaliza-
tion, ￿ ows of workers with small sectoral experience out of the metal sector increase rapidly.
The out￿ ows of old workers with 35 years of sectoral and market experience is close to zero
before free trade and it is una⁄ected by free trade. In free trade steady state, only 2% of the
workers remain in the metal sector. The percentage of workers in the manufacturing sector
slowly rises to 22% from 21% after free trade; in addition, out￿ ows slightly decrease. The
percentage of workers staying at home slightly increases to 3.4% from 3.3%, however it drops
to 3.2% in the free trade steady state, suggesting a possible decrease in the unemployment
rate in the long run. The out￿ ows are 75% for workers with 5 years of market experience
and 65% for workers with 35 years of experience, hence it takes more time to ￿nd a new
job in other sectors if an old worker is displaced because of free trade compared to young
workers.
Welfare of the Workers
As seen in Figure 3, all workers made better o⁄ by free trade except metal workers.
Workers with more sector speci￿c human capital are a⁄ected more by free trade (considering
both positive and negative e⁄ects).
A metal worker with 35 years of sectoral and market experiences a one time loss of
approximately twice of one year￿ s average annual real wage. A metal worker with 35 years
of market and 5 years of sectoral experience loses half of one years wage, which is also a one
time loss in the present discounted lifetime utility. On the other hand, a metal worker with 5
years of sectoral experience has a one time loss of a quarter of one year￿ s wage. These values
can not be compared directly with the results of the literature on displaced workers, since
they only consider wage decreases. For example, Jacobson LaLonde and Sullivan (1993)
report that tenured workers might lose 25% of their wage continuously due to displacement.
That would be equivalent to 210% percent one time loss of one year￿ s wage which is very
close to my ￿ndings. Note that I use present discounted welfare derived from utility functions
21therefore my analysis would include consider non-wage components of the utility as well.
Di⁄erent from the displaced workers literature I can analyze welfare e⁄ects of trade
liberalization in the metal sector on other sectors as well. For example, the welfare of
manufacturing workers increases proportionally to their sectoral and market experience. Old
workers with 35 years of sector and market experience gain almost 30% and young workers
with 5 years of experience gain 15% of annual average real wage.
We see that older workers gain (or lose) an amount ranging between -200% to +30% of
one year￿ s wage. Young workers gain (or lose) an amount ranging between -25% to +15%.
Hence welfare e⁄ects of tari⁄ reduction in the metal sector is shows a wider range on older
workers, creating larger losses and bene￿ts among them, consistent with the ￿ndings of the
Pew Global Attitudes Survey12. Young workers in the metal sector do not experience high
costs since they are very mobile and can easily ￿nd new jobs in the other sectors. Likewise,
young workers in the other sector do not experience high bene￿ts (compared to older) since
they are very mobile and their option value of moving and working in the metal sector
decrease signi￿cantly, which we would like to call a "mirror e⁄ect".
The price index decreases 1.5% which initially increases wages 1.5% in the manufacturing
sector. As metal workers leave their sector and ￿nd new jobs in other sectors, however, wages
slightly decrease after the 1.5% increase; the increase is approximately 1% in the long run.
The retired workers are unanimously better o⁄ since they are only a⁄ected by the decrease
in the price index.
Experience and Welfare
There are two main factors a⁄ecting workers￿attitudes towards free trade: moving costs
and number of years to work. Workers in the metal sector are hurt more if they are less mobile
because it is more di¢ cult for workers with limited mobility to ￿nd new jobs in other sectors.
Workers in other sectors are helped more if they are less mobile because their probability of
working in the metal sector is smaller compared to the workers with high mobility. Hence,
12Note that the question in the survey is on free trade general not on a particular sector as I studied in
this research. Young metal workers can easily be made better o⁄ by a multi-sector trade liberalization since
they are not signi￿cantly worse o⁄. On the other hand, older metal worker will unlikely be better o⁄ even
if there were other sectors opening up for free trade.
22high moving cost increase both the positive and negative e⁄ects of free trade. If a worker
is planning to retire soon, she would only care about the purchasing power of her pension.
Therefore, workers close to retirement in the metal sectors should be hurt less (and might
be even helped) after free trade and workers in other sectors should be helped less after free
trade since they have less time to enjoy the increase in their purchasing power.
Market experience increases moving costs and decreases the expected time horizon to
work; these two e⁄ects work in opposite directions. However, as a worker gains more market
experience, the e⁄ect of an increase in mobility cost dominates the e⁄ect of a decrease in
the time horizon until a worker is very close to her retirement. On the other hand, sectoral
experience increases only moving costs. In Figure 4 and Figure 5, the e⁄ects of sectoral and
market experience on the welfare of workers after free trade are illustrated. Initially, the
change in workers￿welfare increases as their market experience increases; later it decreases
in all sectors. For example, a worker with 35 years of market experience in the metal sector
is hurt more than workers with 30 years and 40 years of experience. Similarly, a worker in
the manufacturing sector with 35 years of market experience is helped more than workers
with 30 and 40 years of market experience. In contrast to market experience, the e⁄ect of
sectoral experience is not ambiguous: sectoral experience increases the welfare loss in the
metal sector and welfare gain in the manufacturing sector.
The age of a worker is positively correlated with her market and sectoral experience. As
seen in Figure 4 and Figure 5, both the positive and negative e⁄ects of trade liberalization
increase by experience, with the exception of workers close to their retirement. Therefore,
experienced workers should be more split in viewing free trade as good or bad, compared to
young workers without experience.
Note that education, as illustrated in Figure 6, and the di⁄erent assumptions on extrap-
olating non-pecuniary moving costs for workers older than 45, do not change the qualitative
implications of the model.
236 Conclusion
I estimated a dynamic structural discrete choice model of sectoral mobility and human
capital accumulation in an open economy subject to trade shocks using the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth. I estimated di⁄erent variations of the model to demonstrate
the robustness of the model and the validity of the assumptions. Finally, I used the esti-
mates of the model to analyze the e⁄ects of a hypothetical trade liberalization in the metal
manufacturing sector, particularly on younger and older workers.
The results show that estimated moving costs are large and increase further by age and
that preference shocks are important in explaining labor mobility, and therefore that psy-
chological and unobserved factors play a role in mobility decisions. However, incorporating
serially correlated preference shocks into the model decreases moving costs. In the case of
free trade in the metal manufacturing sector, younger metal workers will be hurt but hurt
less than older workers. The younger workers in other sectors will be helped, but again less so
than older workers. This stronger e⁄ect on older workers results in a broader division among
older workers in viewing trade liberalization as good or bad than among younger workers,
consistent with the ￿ndings of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey. The exception is workers
close to retirement; retired workers are better o⁄ after free trade regardless of their sector.
The results also show that displaced younger metal workers can ￿nd new jobs in other sectors
faster than older workers if they lose their jobs because of free trade. Increasing mobility
costs by age suggests that non-monotonic age-correlated bene￿ts in the Trade Adjustment
Assistance program may yield a more e¢ cient compensation scheme.
Incorporating capital mobility in the model in addition to worker mobility would allow
us to study the welfare e⁄ects of free trade more precisely, especially over the long run, a
task which is left for future research. The simulations predict that displaced metal workers￿
attempts to ￿nd new jobs in other sectors will be slow, leading to a temporary rise in
unemployment. Pissarides (1985) type searching agents could be used to study how free
trade changes the unemployment rate in the long run, a task which is also left for future
work.
24Appendix - Solution Methods
Model 2.1
I assume that zi
t is distributed mean zero ￿ normal￿with standard deviation ￿z, and ui
t
is mean zero ￿ extreme value￿with standard deviation ￿u, thus zi
t ￿ N (0;￿z) and ei
t ￿
EV (0;￿e). We observe wages and sectoral choices over 10 years and ￿nd the parameters
that maximize the probability of observing such a sample. Let m
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￿
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probability of moving from i to j for a worker with characteristics st given the parameter set
￿ and wage w
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t+1 for the observed choice. Let f (:) be the probability density of the random
variable zt and de￿ne wage equation as
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where W i (st) is the expected wage as de￿ned in the model. Then the likelihood of observing
the sample is
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In order to calculate the probability of sector change, mij, we need to de￿ne the value
functions as in Bellman (1957).
Value Functions:
For the last period the expected alternative speci￿c value is simply
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25and the value function is de￿ned as
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where option value of moving, ￿, is de￿ned as
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where the probability of moving from sector i to sector k given z can be de￿ned as:
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Note that expectation on u, Eu, can be calculated analytically because it is additive to the
utility. However expectation on z, Ez, has to be simulated or calculated using numerical
integration since it is not additive to the utility. Also note that random shock to wage, z,
will be known for exactly one sector in each period since we observe wage for the sector the
worker is in.
Model 2.2 and 2.5
26It is not possible to use a standard multinomial logit procedure since we observe wage
o⁄ers only for one sector in each period for each worker. For example if the worker is in
the manufacturing sector, the wage o⁄er is known by the econometrician; however, for other
sectors (i.e. agriculture) it is not known. Therefore, for the sector that is chosen by the
worker the randomness comes only from the idiosyncratic component, ui
t. For other sectors
randomness comes from both wage and idiosyncratic utility, zi
t+ui
t from the econometrician￿ s
perspective. A simple approximation method can be used to aggregate all choices those are
not chosen and consider them as a single choice: So best alternative to dt is denoted as
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dt
t+1
￿￿
= V ar
￿
u
dt
t+1
￿
. With this nota-
tion we simplify worker￿ s options to what he actually chose, dt, versus the best alternative
j 6= dt. Note that j 6= dt does not refer to any actual option but expected value of the
second best, in other words Emax of the options except dt. Since those two options has
di⁄erent variances, exact analytical solution does not exist. However it is possible to ￿nd
a simple approximate solution: Consider an "iid extreme value" random variable "i
t, where
V ar("i
t) = fV ar(ui
t) + V ar(ei
t)g=2, and assume that V
j6=dt
t+1 ’ E
￿
V
j6=dt
t+1 jst+1
￿
+ "1
t+1 and
V
dt
t+1 ’ E
￿
V
dt
t+1jst+1;w
dt
t+1
￿
+ "2
t+1. Then probability of observing decision dt given wage and
state vector is
m
dt￿1dt
t =
exp
h￿
EV
dt
t+1 ￿ EV
dt￿1
t+1 ￿ Cdt￿1;dt
￿
=￿"
i
exp
h￿
EV
j6=dt
t+1 ￿ EV
dt￿1
t+1 ￿ Cdt￿1;j
￿
=￿"
i
+ exp
h￿
EV
dt
t+1 ￿ EV
dt￿1
t+1 ￿ Cdt￿1;dt
￿
=￿"
i;
variance of "t is equal to 1
6￿2
"￿2.
Model 2.3 and 2.4
I will use Indirect Inference to estimate the extended models. Indirect Inference is very
useful when it is easy to simulate data from a model but di¢ cult to estimate the parameters.
The main idea is to simulate data from a model and compare it to the actual data and try to
make them as similar as possible. A misspeci￿ed model, which is called the auxiliary model,
27can be used to evaluate similarity between two data sets. The process is straightforward: 1.
I estimate the parameters of the auxiliary model using actual data, 2. I guess parameters
of the actual model and simulate data using actual model, 3. I estimate parameters of the
auxiliary model using simulated data. 4. I compare the estimated parameters of auxiliary
model and continue this procedure (step 2 to 4) until parameters of the actual data and
simulated data are reasonably close to each other. Let QA be the actual data set and
QS (￿;x) be the data set simulated using the parameter vector ￿ and exogenous variable
set x. Consider the auxiliary likelihood function L(Q;￿). De￿ne ^ ￿ = argmax￿ L
￿
QA;￿
￿
,
and ~ ￿ = argmax￿ L
￿
QS (￿;x);￿
￿
. Now I have to de￿ne a norm to evaluate the similarity
between ^ ￿ and ~ ￿, or QA and QS:
Norm proposed by Smith:
^ ￿ = argmax
￿
L
￿
Q
A; ~ ￿ (￿)
￿
,
Norm inspired from Wald
^ ￿ = argmin
￿
￿
^ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ (￿)
￿0
W
￿
^ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ (￿)
￿
,
Norm inspired from Gallant and Tauchen
^ ￿ = argmin
￿
@L
￿
QS (￿;x); ^ ￿
￿
@￿
0 W
@L
￿
QS (￿;x); ^ ￿
￿
@￿
,
where W is the weighting matrix. For more detailed discussion on other possible norms and
indirect inference in general see Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault 1993 and Smith 1993.
Auxiliary Model:
The main idea is to use the basic model as the auxiliary model, however I prefer a slightly
modi￿ed version of the basic model. I change the error terms in such a way that all choices
have the same random error components, so that the model is a regular multinomial logit
model. The basic model shows some similarities with a multinomial logit model. It can
be considered as a two step logit model, because I ￿rst calculate the expected value of the
28second best alternative, then I calculate the probability of choosing the observed alternative.
Converting the model into a regular logit model creates some bias in the estimated para-
meters, which is not a problem as long as we can de￿ne a one to one relationship between
the auxiliary model parameters and the actual parameters. Using a regular logit model has
an important advantage because it is possible to evaluate a logit likelihood function without
using any loops like "for" or "while", by just using simple matrix operations after calculating
the value function. The motive for using matrix operations instead of loops is to exploit the
built-in matrix operation functions which are much faster than user written loops (i.e. Mat-
lab 7.0). Note that if the matrix operations are manually written or if they are not e¢ ciently
programmed this e⁄ort would be futile (i.e. Fortran 90).
Consider ￿ V i
t+1 = EV i
t+1 + wi
t+1 ￿ ~ wi
t+1 if dt = i, and ￿ V i
t+1 = EV i
t+1 if dt 6= i.
￿ m
ik
t (st;￿;￿ ￿) =
exp
￿￿
E ￿ V i
t+1 ￿ E ￿ V k
t+1 ￿ Ci;k￿
=￿ ￿
￿
P
j exp
￿￿
E ￿ V i
t+1 ￿ E ￿ V
j
t+1 ￿ Ci;j￿
=￿ ￿
￿,
Using the probability function above the parameters of the auxiliary model can be estimated
as
~ ￿
r
= argmax
K Y
k=1
(
10 Y
￿=1
￿ m
dk
￿;dk
￿+1
￿
￿
s￿;w
ni
￿
￿
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w
ni
￿+1 ￿ W
￿
s
n
￿+1
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￿+1
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￿+1
￿)
.
Assume that the parameter vector of the true structural model is ￿, and the auxiliary estimate
for the rth simulated data set is ~ ￿
r
where the total number of simulated data sets is R. The
goal is to simulate the data from parameter vector ^ ￿ such that ~ ￿ = 1
R
X
~ ￿
r
will maximize
the likelihood of observing the actual data set under the auxiliary model as described by
Smith 1993.
Simulations
We use a method similar to multiple shooting, described in Lipton et al. 1982, to solve
for the transition and steady states. The solution described here is for one type of worker,
it can be generalized for more than one type simply by increasing the state space.
Steady State:
We will exploit the lack of aggregate uncertainty, the only uncertainty is the one time
29shock to price because of trade liberalization. So the system we are solving is deterministic
since we only have a one time shock and nothing else stochastic. The random idiosyncratic
shocks in the model do not make the aggregate system stochastic because we have a contin-
uum of workers, hence all agents have a perfect foresight of the aggregate parameters (except
the trade shock). If we know the steady state labor allocation, Li, we can calculate wages,
wi. If we know the steady state values of workers, V i, we can calculate their probabilities of
sector change, mij. Moreover knowing mij and wi it is possible to calculate values of workers
V i. Hence all parameters can be considered functions of other parameters:
w
i
t =
pi
t
CPIt
@Qi (Li
t)
@Li
t
,
where Qi is the production function and CPIt is the consumer price index. Probability of
sector change
m
nik
t = Ez
exp
￿￿
EuV nk
t+1 ￿ EuV ni
t+1 ￿ Cn;i;k￿
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￿
P
j exp
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t+1 ￿ EuV ni
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t+1,
Labor allocation
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Let Xt = [L1
t;L2
t:::;L60
t ;V 1
t ;V 2
t ;:::;V 60
t ]
0 and consider the system above as a mapping F :
<120 ! <120, such that Xt = F (Xt+1). In the steady state Xt = Xt+1, therefore there is a
￿xed point of function F. The steady state is the solution of the nonlinear equation
F
￿
X
SS￿
￿ X
SS = 0.
which can be solved by any nonlinear equation solver.
Transition:
30Solving for transition is relatively more di¢ cult than the steady state but the problem
can be attacked by a similar approach. The economy is at autarchy steady state equilibrium
initially, at time 0 and then the economy switches to free trade as shock therapy. Consider
the system above, assume starting from t = 0 the economy will become su¢ ciently close to
its free trade steady state XFT at t = T, such that
￿
XT ￿ XFT￿0 ￿
XT ￿ XFT￿
< ￿,where ￿
is a very small number for the tolerance level. We will conveniently assume that XT+k =
XT for every k ￿ 0, since there will not be any aggregate shocks in the economy. Let
X = [X0;X1;X2;:::;XT]
0, be the transition of all state and control variables starting from
t = 0, (autarchy) until t = T, (free trade steady state). Then we can de￿ne a mapping from
H : <60(T+1) ￿ [0;1]
60 ! <60(T+1), such that X = H (X;L0). Therefore this problem is just
a larger version of the steady state problem. We solve the nonlinear equation
H (X;L0) ￿ X = 0; (23)
to ￿nd the ￿xed point. Note that this time we can consider Xt = [V 1
t ;V 2
t ;:::;V 6
t ]
0 since the
initial labor allocation, L0, is now known and it can be calculated forward.
In practice we ￿rst ￿nd the steady state of autarchy and of free trade. Then we guess a
value for T, such as 40. Starting from the steady state autarchy labor allocation we solve
the nonlinear equation (23).Finally we check if XT is equal to the free trade steady state, if
so we are done and if not we increase T, and repeat the procedure.
Wage Equation
Consider the production function:
y = b
 
X
n
L
nh
n
!￿
,
where b is a constant and Ln is the number of workers with e⁄ective human capital level hn.
Assume that workers receive their real marginal product:
w
n =
p
￿
@y
@Ln,
31where p is the price of the product and ￿ is the price index. Then
w
n =
p
￿
b￿
 
X
n
L
nh
n
!￿￿1
h
n,
where L is the total number of workers. Assume that ￿ h. is the average human capital
in sector. Now consider the human capital accumulation process: hn = H (sn) + z, then
the average e⁄ective human capital in the sector is ￿ h = 1
L
 
X
n
Lnhn
!
,where H is a linear
function of state variables sn and z is a mean random shock to each worker￿ s e⁄ective human
capital. Note that z is di⁄erent for all workers and it is mean zero. Therefore we can write
wages using average human capital such as
w
n =
p
￿
b￿
￿
L￿ h
￿￿￿1 h
n,
Now consider the average wage in sector:
￿ w =
p
￿
b￿
￿
L￿ h
￿￿￿1 ￿ h.
Hence we can write wages as a function of average e⁄ective human capital and average
wages in sectors
w
n =
p
￿
b￿
￿
L￿ h
￿￿￿1 h
n,
= ￿ w
hn
￿ h
.
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